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ESSAY, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS
Petros C. Mavroidis*

I. THE ROLE THAT THE WTO CAN PLAY FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE DISPUTES
A. In General
The role that the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays in the
settlement of United States-Japan trade disputes is, but should not be, U.S. and
Japan-specific. The WTO is a multilateral forum and this aspect of its character
must be maintained for the WTO to acquire credibility in the settlement of trade
disputes. Trade disputes, if at all, should be exceptional not because of the
parties involved, but because of their subject matter. Nothing indicates that the
U.S.-Japan trade disputes are subject matter-specific. In fact, the opposite is true:
there is ample evidence demonstrating that disputes over the same issues among
different actors are a recurrent theme. For example, see the Tuna-Dolphin cases
and the recent Shrimps-Turtle case; also see Japan-AlcoholicBeverages and the
Korea-Alcoholic Beverages cases; moreover, check the series of antidumping
cases submitted to the GATT/WTO regime.
Consequently, my comments on this point should be viewed in the
context described above. In other words, my comments reflect that the WTO is a
forum to address disputes in a consistent manner independent of the identity of
the parties to the dispute.

B. Specific Points
1. Recent Case Record
Big improvements have recently been made in the way panels handle
cases, especially since the inception of the WTO. Panel reports are internally
consistent and the requirements of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
have facilitated the interpretation of the covered agreements in accordance with
customary international law. Consequently, case law develops in a linear way.
This panel report, like previous reports, is persuasive. The panel chose its
standard, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in full compliance with
Article 3.2 DSU and built a very reasonable argument concerning the
interpretation of the term "like products." Moreover, the panel went on not only
*
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to fird support for its argument in previous GATT case law, but also to dismiss
the argument presented in an unadopted report, the "Gas Guzzler" panel report,
thus demonstrating that it does not conceive its role as an ad hoc institution, but
rather as part of a continuum.
:In my opinion, this is by far the most important role panels, and any
adjudicating body for this purpose, have to fill. Thomas M. Franck, author of
Fairness in International Institutions (1995), makes, in my opinion, the correct
argument that consistency in the application of the law is the most suitable means
for any adjudicating body, especially for international bodies where the
monopoly of enforcement is often lacking, to acquire credibility. I read William
J. Davey's article, "Dispute Settlement in GATT," 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 51
(1987), which appeared in the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal in the same
vein. Davey's remarks concerning adjudicating bodies that simply settle
disputes, those that are results-oriented, and bodies which are law-oriented make
a similar argument. In the case of law-oriented bodies, the means-in the form
of legal reasoning-is what counts. And this is precisely the area where
consistency is required.
The Appellate Body (AB) was supposed to provide the necessary
consistency in WTO law. Taking into account that panels are ad hoc bodies, the
Uruguay Round negotiators decided that some form of more permanent
institution was necessary to hold the system together. Panels however, act as if
they were a permanent body, as described above, notwithstanding the fact that
one of their components, the panelists, changes every time a panel is established.
At best, commentators have mixed feelings about the AB's record thus
far. Yet this is not a reproach to the AB. On issues of law, one may sometimes
disagree as to their expediency, although not always, since law is to a large
extent quite precise. With too much controversy, law does not fulfill its major
objective, namely legal security. For example, I have expressed skepticism
concerning the outcomes of the Hormones case and the Indian Textiles case.
Here I air personally addressing the role of the AB. In this discussion, it is not
only the AB which can affirm its role-through the "inside out" perspective, to
paraphrase Keohane-but also the way WTO Members see the AB-the "outside
in" perspective.
The AB's purpose is to ensure consistency in the interpretation of WTO
law. According to its mandate, it should confine itself to issues of law only and
moreover, only to those issues of law raised by the parties to a dispute. So far
this is not always what the AB has done. When it decided to exceed the
aforementioned limit, the AB illustrated that it has and knows how to use a
considerable amount of imagination. See, for example, the Periodicalscase.
Moreover, governments seem to understand the AB as a necessary second look at
the same case and almost all panel reports have been appealed. The AB is
invariably perceived to be more like a later-in-time panel rather than the guardian
of law. Otherwise, it is difficult to assess the behavior of a number of WTO
Members who appeal quite "weak" cases. Public choice theory most likely
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dictates such behavior for governments.
By appealing panel reports,
governments can persuasively tell domestic lobbyists that they did everything at
their disposal to defend "domestic interests." Moreover, in the event they lose,
government's can always blame modifications of national policy to the WTO as
the reason for the loss, even though the government would undertake the changes
regardless of some lobbyist's reactions. Robert E. Hudec refers to the "use
GATT as an excuse" argument in "GATT and the Developing Countries," 1992
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 67.
Independent of the way WTO Members look at the AB, it is up to the
AB to re-define its role. It can achieve this only through its case law. While it is
true that under the Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 59
considerations are prevalent in the WTO, and that AB decisions bind only the
parties to the dispute, one has to accept that there is an inherent intellectual
inconsistency; how can the AB be requested to confine itself to legal
interpretations of terms mentioned in the covered agreements and at the same
time make the argument that its decisions are dispute-specific? Cross-border
applications are not only appropriate, but should be welcome. It is true that the
AB refers to its own law. Sometimes however, its own law suffers from
imprecision. What comes under the notion of GATT-acquis, for example what
did the AB, in defiance of existing texts, invent in the Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages case? And how exactly do WTO Members discharge their obligations
when they have to create a presumption as the AB clarified in the Indian Textiles
case? And what should we deduce from the AB's confusion with respect to
burden of proof and restrictive interpretation in the Hormones case?
So far, the AB's decisions have not been criticized in the doctrine. One
explanation could be that it is too soon and people want to give the AB a chance
to establish itself first. Such an argument is reinforced by the fact that a rulesoriented approach has not always been welcome in most comers of the trade
field. Another explanation might be that, in essence, the AB has not overruled
the crux of the panels' recommendations, although perhaps in some peripheral
respects it did so in the Periodicals and the Gasoline cases, and as far as the
remedy is concerned in the Hormones case. This last observation may explain
why governments have not reacted yet, but can hardly account for the
fionchalance of academics.

2. Fact Finding in De Facto Discrimination
This area provides some confusion. The Kodak/Fujipanel is referred to
in the context of defacto discrimination. This panel, though, did not address a
violation-complaint and defacto discrimination is a violation because Article I
of GATT does not distinguish between de jure and de facto discrimination.
Additionally, relevant GAIT case law has interpreted it to cover both.
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My comments, therefore, are of a more general nature and address the
issues of fact-finding as such. In "The Need for Due Process in WTO
Proceedings," published in the Journalof World Trade, Thomas makes the point
that GATT panels traditionally base their decisions on an undisputed cluster of
facts. Even in very recent cases, such as the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case, the
panelists used the evidence submitted by the parties, which served as adequate
proof. For example, in the case of the Japanese panel mentioned previously,
even evidence submitted by Japan did not deny the existence of demand
substitutability between sochu and western drinks in the Japanese markets.
The first time that there was a dispute before a panel over a factual issue
was in the Hormones case where the parties disagreed about the harmful effects
of hormones. Interestingly, the panel record shows no divergence between the
opinions of the experts called by the parties to present their opinions. This is an
issue, however, that could come up in the near future, especially in the context of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).
If this situation does arise, panelists and AB Members might be called to weigh
conflicting scientific evidence. It is hard to come up with a convincing solution
in this context. Then again, this is not a WTO-specific issue; adjudicating bodies
around the world sometimes exercise discretion when facing similar issues.
Therefore, the challenge facing the WTO in this context is not unique-the
WTO, like other fora, will have to ensure that it has not blurred the fine line
between discretion and arbitrariness.
When it comes to more "banal" issues, like market studies showing the
negative inpact of government regulation on foreign products, two things should
be kept in mind. First, we must remember that GATT is not an instrument for
deregulation. Article III prohibits discrimination. There is no ex ante
presumption of illegality of any governmental intervention. Second, it is worth
noting that nothing prohibits panels, in cases of conflicting evidence, from
requesting additional evidence through expert submissions. So far, however, a
case of conflicting evidence is this context has not arisen.
3. Defects of the WTO DSU: Fact-finding and Competition Cases
The WTO has been criticized, on the one hand, for its fact-fimding
defects and, on the other hand, for its inability to deal with competition cases.
This is not entirely correct. When it comes to fact-finding, I do not think any
other method would effectuate better results than the existing system does.
Panels have the power to request any information they deem necessary to resolve
disputes. If this has a repercussion on the time frame of the whole procedure, I
think that parties to a dispute should always be willing to extend the time limits,
which are arguably unreasonable to begin with, in order to secure a sound
judgment. Otherwise, the parties risk sacrificing soundness of the panel report
for the sake of an ill-conceived speedy remedy.
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When referring to competition-related cases, the opinion that there is a
need to bring in the framework of the WTO in such disputes has been presented a
number of times, for example, in the work of Petersmann. I ascribe to the
skeptic's view. In a paper about to be published entitled "Do Negative Spillovers
from Nationally Pursued Competition Policies Provide a Case for Multilateral
Competition Rules?" Bacchetta, Hom and Mavroidis argue that proponents of a
WTO agreement have not yet addressed a series of issues necessary for the
international community to justify an intervention and regulation. These issues
are as follows: (i) although economic theory suggests that negative externalities
can exist from nationally pursued antitrust policies, no one thus far has measured
such externalities and use of existing mechanisms (even instruments that have
low admissibility thresholds, like U.S. Section 301) suggests that they are not
that important; (ii) existing instruments both in the antitrust and in the trade fields
seem prima facie appropriate to address such concerns and, when used, have
been proved to be quite effective; and (iii) there is a long unfinished trade agenda
(antidumping, agriculture, textiles, government procurement) and no one has
persuasively argued why the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on
competition should take precedence.

II. BILATERAL APPROACH FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF U.S-JAPAN.
TRADE DISPUTES
One comment on this topic is worth noting. Article 3.6 DSU makes it
clear that all bilateral settlements on matters formally raised under the DSU have
to be submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Thus, the issue is
whether or not discussion on solutions not formally raised should be addressed.
However legally speaking, the only difference between the two situations is an
obligation of transparency that is present in the former scenario and absent in the
latter. Even in the case where a matter has not been formally raised under the
DSU and a bilateral solution has still been reached, any WTO Member can bring
a complaint against the solution to the extent that its rights have been nullified or
impaired as a result of the settlement. After all, wasn't the Semiconductors case
similar to this example?
I. THE ROLE OF U.S. SECTION 301 IN THE WTO
A. In General
Most of the critics of U.S. Section 301 have focused their attention on
its actual use, which sometimes, arguably violates existing multilateral rules, and
then proceed to make sweeping statements about its overall compatibility with
the WTO rules. Section 301 is a classic instrument of diplomatic protection.
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Because private parties do not have locus standi before an international forum,
such instruments are necessary for complaints to be brought to the attention of
the government, which in turn will represent the interests concerned.
Such instruments do not exist only in the U.S. I am not familiar with
the situation in Japan, but in the European Community (EC) the Trade Barriers
Regulation operates, in principle, in a similar fashion. It is difficult to make an
assessment about the overall compatibility of such instrument within the
international framework, as most of the time these instruments allow ample
discretion to the government entertaining private complaints. Consequently,
criticism must focus on the actual use of such instruments.

B. Specific Points
1. The Importance of U.S. Section 301 in the WTO Era
As stated above, in principle, U.S. Section 301 should be unaffected by
the formation of the WTO to the extent that it functions as an instrument of
diplomatic protection. U.S. Section 301 will remain a procedural vehicle to bring
private complaints before the appropriate international forum, either before a
WTO panel or the AB, as the case may be.
2. The Role of U.S. Section 301 in Cases Dealing with WTO Covered
Issues
First, we need to clarify what is meant when we qualify something as an
"uncovered issue." Lax enforcement of competition laws could be a covered
issue. For example, claiming that they can make millions of yen around the
world, two exporting companies have requested that the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC) allow them to form an export cartel and then subsequently
cross-subsidize domestic sales for the benefit of the Japanese consumer. Because
the JFTC likes this idea, it proceeds to issue a letter of clearance stating that the
two exporting companies are immune from any potential governmental pursuit.
In this case, any WTO Member may have a legitimate Article XI GATT claim
against Japan, although competition as such is not a covered agreement.
If we are referencing unambiguously uncovered agreements, the
benchmark to assess U.S. Section 301 actions is public international law. This
means that the fact that WTO rules do not extend to a particular area does not
render any of U.S. Section 301 mandates legal. Other rules of public
international law could apply and may eventually prohibit a particular behavior.

